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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the vast majority of children born in the United States,
1
their legal parents are determined at birth. In every state, there is a
self-executing statute that identifies the woman who gives birth to a
†
Associate Dean and Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
Thank you to Jacob McKnite and Michael Zwickey for their invaluable research
assistance.
†† Attorney, Maslon Edelman Borman & Brand, LLP.
1. JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 26 (2006) (“The
state directly determines who a child’s legal parents will be at the time of birth and
then at every moment of a person’s childhood.”); JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF
THE CHILD 58 (2014) (noting that all parental power is a function delegated by the
state).
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child as the child’s legal mother. Also in every state, there are selfexecuting statutes that apply a set of presumptions to identify the
3
child’s legal father. These statutes solidify family relationships at
the moment of birth, which not only avoids the costly and timeconsuming process of obtaining a court order to determine the
legal parents of every child born, but also avoids the legal
uncertainty that the child and parents would endure before such
4
an order were issued. Through these self-executing parentage
statutes, children, parents, and the state know, at the moment of
birth, who the child’s legal parents are and, thereby, who is legally
5
responsible for the care and nurturing of the child.
The process of a self-executing statute identifying the legal
parents of a child at the moment of birth is so automatic that it is
6
rarely considered. The process of determining legal parentage
through a self-executing statute is nearly identical in every state
and, it is fair to say, universally accepted by legislators, judges,
parents, and commentators. This is as it should be: self-executing
parentage statutes are widely published, accessible to the public,
create predictable results, and result in an efficient determination
of parentage at the moment of birth.
Unfortunately, state parentage statutes fall short of
accomplishing their intended goals because they do not provide
legal parents at the moment of birth to every child. It is often only
children conceived via sexual reproduction who reap the stabilizing
benefits of state parentage statutes. In contrast, children conceived
via assisted reproductive technology (ART) most often begin their
2. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-1125 of the
2014 Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101
(West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation).
3. See, e.g., FAM. § 7611(a) (Westlaw); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(a)
(Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 257.55; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116 (Westlaw); see
also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of
Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 233 (2006).
4. See J. Herbie Difonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Children of Baby M., 39 CAP. U.
L. REV. 345, 410 (2011) (describing a legal system that did not provide clear
parentage rules as “chaotic and dysfunctional”).
5. See SHULMAN, supra note 1, at 30 (discussing the duties and obligations
that accompany legal parenthood).
6. Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 645, 649 (2014) (“The vast majority of the time, parentage law
invisibly supports uncomplicated relationships: a baby is born at a hospital to a
woman whose male partner is on hand and joyfully identifies himself as father.”).
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lives without clearly identified legal parents. It is our contention
that the time has come for state legislatures to provide
comprehensive, self-executing parentage statutes that determine
the legal parents at the moment of birth for all children—
including those conceived via ART. In the past, state legislatures
might have rationalized that they had not updated their parentage
statutes to provide legal parents for ART children because ART was
new, and they were not yet aware of the issue. ART, however, has
been used in the conception of children for over one hundred
8
years and, for the past thirty years, has been written about in law
review articles, debated in state legislatures, and confronted by
9
family court judges. In the past, state legislatures also might have
rationalized that they were reluctant to update their parentage
statutes to provide legal parents for children conceived via ART
because they wanted to give commentators, legal experts, and
courts time to experiment with the issue so that the best possible
approach could be determined. Even assuming that it is good
legislative practice to let legal parentage of children blow in the
wind while waiting for someone else to figure out a solution, this
explanation also is past its prime. For thirty years, legal scholars
have debated, legislatures have experimented, and courts have
applied various tests to determine legal parentage of ART
10
children. Legislatures no longer need to wait to determine the
best method for determining legal parentage of children conceived
11
via ART. The overwhelming majority of legal scholars, legislatures,
7. ART, broadly speaking, encompasses any means to achieve pregnancy
other than sexual intercourse. The most common ART procedures are alternative
insemination and in vitro fertilization.
8. JUDITH DAAR, REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 27–28 (2006)
(noting the use of alternative insemination as early as the late-eighteenth century);
Kara W. Swanson, Adultery by Doctor: Artificial Insemination, 1890–1945, 87 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 591, 592 (2012) (“While the number of assisted conceptions was increasing
in the 1940s, doctors had been using this technically simple technique of family
formation for decades.”).
9. See infra Part II.B; see also Albert P. Massey, Jr., Artificial Insemination: The
Law’s Illegitimate Child?, 9 VILL. L. REV. 77, 78–80 (1963). See generally B. Fain
Tucker, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 33 WOMEN L.J. 57 (1947) (providing
early commentary on ART).
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the
Law, 23 VT. L. REV 225, 225–26 (1998) (“[T]he hesitancy of American legislatures
to take on the task of regulating reproductive technology may well prove to have
been more beneficial than detrimental. In effect, American law has had a few
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and courts have reached a consensus: When determining legal
parentage of children conceived via ART, state legislatures should
adopt self-executing parentage statutes that identify the intended
parents as the legal parents of the child at the moment of birth.
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Marjorie Shultz introduced
the intent test as a means to determine parentage of children
12
conceived via ART. According to Professor Shultz, when a child is
conceived via ART, the persons who intended to bring the child
into the world and raise the child should be the child’s legal
13
parents. Since then, numerous legal scholars have endorsed
14
Professor Shultz’s intent test. In 1993, the California Supreme
15
Court first applied the intent test in Johnson v. Calvert. In Johnson,
both the surrogate who gestated the child and the woman who
provided the egg used to conceive the child claimed to be the
16
child’s legal mother. The court held that the genetic mother was
the legal mother, as opposed to the gestational surrogate, because
the genetic mother was the woman who intended to raise the child
17
at the time the child was conceived. Since Johnson, over 20% of
18
disputed ART parentage cases have applied the intent test, and
over 74% of disputed ART parentage cases have awarded parentage
to the intended parents, regardless of which test the court used to

decades to try various approaches, to discard those that did not work, and to
elaborate those that did.”).
12. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 323–26
(1990).
13. Id. at 323 (“Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques,
intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought
presumptively to determine legal parenthood.”).
14. See infra Part II.B.
15. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
16. Id. at 778. A gestational surrogate is “a woman who is not an intended
parent into whom an embryo formed using eggs other than her own is
transferred.” See infra Part III, § 101(4); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (10th
ed. 2014) (defining “gestational surrogate” as “[a] woman who carries out the
gestational function and gives birth to a child for another . . . and who
relinquishes any parental rights she may have upon the birth of the child.”).
17. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
18. Mary Patricia Byrn & Lisa Giddings, An Empirical Analysis of the Use of the
Intent Test to Determine Parentage in Assisted Reproductive Technology Cases, 50 HOUS. L.
REV. 1295, 1309 tbl.1 (2013) (analyzing the 208 cases on Westlaw in which
parentage of a child conceived via ART was determined).
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19

determine parentage.
In addition, since Professor Shultz
published her article, every model parentage act that has been
drafted in the United States has incorporated the intent test to
20
determine legal parentage for children conceived via ART.
Part II of this article argues that states should adopt selfexecuting parentage statutes based on the intent test to provide
legal parents at the moment of birth to all children conceived
21
via ART. As support for this proposition, Part II discusses the
underlying goals of self-executing parentage statutes, and how, for
children conceived via ART, the intent test best effectuates those
goals. Part II also discusses results from a recent empirical study
showing that, in over 74% of ART disputed-parentage cases, the
22
intended parents were determined to be the legal parents. Part II
concludes that consensus has been reached among scholars,
legislatures, and courts in favor of using the intent test to
determine legal parentage at the moment of birth for children
conceived via ART.
Part III of this article proposes a comprehensive ART statute
that incorporates the intent test and provides legal parents at the
moment of birth to all children conceived via ART as an example
23
for states to adopt.
II. DETERMINING LEGAL PARENTAGE OF CHILDREN CONCEIVED VIA
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AT THE MOMENT OF BIRTH
States have been using self-executing statutes to determine
parentage of children conceived via sexual reproduction for
hundreds of years. In all fifty states, when a child is conceived via
sexual reproduction, the woman who gives birth to the child is
24
deemed the child’s legal mother. All fifty states also have a set of

19. Id. at 1318.
20. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703, 801, 807 (2000) (amended 2002),
9B U.L.A. 356, 362–63, 368 (Supp. 2014); MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED
REPROD. TECH. §§ 603–604 (2008); see also Gestational Surrogacy Act, 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/15 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 98-1125 of the 2014 Sess.)
(basing parentage on intent when gestational surrogacy is used); UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2–121(a)(4) (amended 2010) (using the intent test to determine
parentage in a gestational surrogacy).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1317–18.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.);
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presumptions that identify the child’s legal father at the moment of
25
birth. These statutory mechanisms provide a predictable means of
determining parental rights and obligations at the moment of
birth, and they avoid the costly and time-consuming process of
obtaining a court order identifying the legal parents every time a
child is born.
When it comes to children conceived via ART, however, selfexecuting parentage statutes are rare. As a result, most parents that
use ART to create a family must obtain a court order to formalize
their legal parent-child relationship. Thus, while legal parentage
for children conceived via sexual reproduction is determined at
birth through automatic, efficient, and predictable statutes, legal
parentage for children conceived via ART typically is not
determined at birth and requires the intervention of a court, which
26
can be costly, time-consuming, and unpredictable.
It is our contention that it is time to bring the benefits of
automatic, efficient, and predictable statutes to the determination
27
of legal parentage for all children conceived via ART. We base this
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4(1) (Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2012);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101 (West, Westlaw through 2014 legislation).
25. Typically, the person deemed the child’s legal father is: the man who is
married to the biological mother at the time of the child’s birth; the man who,
along with the biological mother, expressly acknowledges his paternity; or the man
who receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
biological child. See, e.g., FAM. § 7611(a) (Westlaw); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
45/5(a) (Westlaw); MINN. STAT. § 257.55; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116
(Westlaw); see also Appleton, supra note 3, at 233 (noting that the marital
presumption “instantly designates a man as a child’s legal father at the time of
birth”).
26. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child:
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J.
C.R. & C.L. 201, 216 (2009) (arguing that parentage laws should provide children
of same-sex couples “certainty and stability . . . without requiring those parents to
spend the money or time necessary for a court proceeding.”); see Rebecca Aviel, A
New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2007 (2014) (asserting
that family law’s emphasis on “formal legal status has been needlessly tethered to a
traditionalist view of legitimate family composition” and arguing that parentage
laws should be “determinate but not traditional” so as to include, inter alia,
children conceived via ART).
27. Professor Rebecca Aviel, in arguing for extending formal rules for
identifying legal parents at birth to children conceived via ART, asserts that
“[w]hatever differences we may sustain regarding how best to promote child
welfare . . . it is difficult to argue that children are best served by a regime that
cannot identify their parents prospectively and cannot ensure that any given
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argument on two rationales: (1) self-executing ART parentage
statutes can achieve the same social goals as the statutes that
determine legal parents for children conceived via sexual
28
reproduction; and (2) the past thirty years of study and
experimentation have led scholars, legislatures, and courts to a
consensus in favor of self-executing ART parentage statutes based
29
on the intent test.
A.

Achieving the Social Goals of Self-Executing Parentage Statutes

For children conceived via sexual reproduction, state
legislatures designate legal parentage via self-executing statutes that
are based on a set of presumptions that identify legal parents in the
same way for every child. For children conceived via sexual
reproduction, the traditional basis for legal parentage is a
30
presumption in favor of genetics. The woman who gives birth to a
child conceived via sexual reproduction is the genetic mother and
31
the legal mother. In addition, the marital presumption vests legal
parentage in the birth-mother’s husband—the man presumed to
32
be the genetic father. In the wake of the 1973 Uniform Parentage
Act (1973 UPA), in an effort to remove the legal stigma attached
individual is vested with parental status without a complex, multi-factor judicial
determination.” Aviel, supra note 26, at 2063.
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. DWYER, supra note 1, at 31–32 (“That biological parenthood remains the
predominant focus even with marital births is evidenced by the fact that
throughout the West, a husband’s presumption of paternity remains rebuttable on
the basis of—and only on the basis of—genetic tests showing that he is not in fact
the biological father.”); Elizabeth Bartholet, Guiding Principles for Picking Parents, 27
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 323, 329 (2004) (noting that “traditional family law . . . makes
biology extremely important”).
31. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.54(a) (2012); see Shultz, supra note 12, at 316 (“In
the main, the law’s assignment of parental status has followed nature. Biology
provided definitive identification of the mother of a particular child. Bearing and
birthing a child were physically apparent; motherhood was simply a fact.”).
32. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.55, subdiv. 1(a). The reliance on the marital
presumption as a proxy for genetics is demonstrated by the traditional exceptions
to the presumption. The presumption did not apply if: (1) the husband and wife
were not cohabitating; (2) the husband was sterile or impotent; (3) the husband
was “beyond the four seas” at the time of conception; or (4) the race of the child
did not match the husband’s. Appleton, supra note 3, at 251. In other words, if the
child could not have been the husband’s genetic child, then the marital
presumption identifying him as the legal father did not apply.
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to non-marital births, every state added additional paternity
33
presumptions to their parentage statutes. With these additional
presumptions, men who were not married to the birth mother
could assert their likely genetic relationship to the child, resulting
34
in legal parentage at birth. The impact of these additional
presumptions was that thousands of children who otherwise would
not have had a legal father without a court proceeding had the
benefit of two legal parents at the moment of birth. Parentage
statutes for children conceived via sexual reproduction work so well
not because they vest parentage in the genetic parent, per se, but
because they include a presumption that applies in every case that
avoids a post-birth factual inquiry and grants parentage to the
persons that, in the majority of cases, will act in the best interests of
the child. Although the exact details of the parentage
presumptions have changed over time, self-executing parentage

33. Under common law, a child born out of wedlock was considered
illegitimate and therefore ineligible for many of the benefits available to children
of married couples. In creating the 1973 UPA, the Uniform Law Commissioners
addressed a number of problems related to parentage of non-marital children.
Section 2 of the 1973 UPA states that the goal was to ensure that “[t]he parent and
child relationship extends equally to every child and every parent, regardless of
the marital status of the parent.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 390 (1973).
The 1973 UPA, however, included ART only to the extent that it provided legal
parents to children conceived by alternative insemination to a married,
heterosexual couple. Id. § 2, 9B U.L.A. 407–08. If a child was conceived via ART
outside those narrow parameters, the “parent and child relationship” did not
extend equally to her. Id. prefatory note, 9B U.L.A. 378; see id. § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407–
08.
34. In Minnesota, the paternity presumption statute makes clear that the
presumption is based on an assumption about biology: “A man is presumed to be
the biological father of a child if:” (1) he is married to the woman at the time of the
child’s birth, (2) he, along with the biological mother, expressly acknowledges his
paternity, or (3) “he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the
child as his biological child” as the presumptive legal father. MINN. STAT. § 257.55,
subdiv. 1 (emphasis added). See Appleton, supra note 3, at 258 (discussing how the
traditional views of the paternity presumptions sought to “connect men and their
likely genetic offspring”); see also Janet L. Dolgin, Choice, Tradition, and the New
Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32 CONN. L. REV. 523, 527 (2000)
(“For centuries . . . courts determined paternity by relying on a presumption about
biological facts.”). Referring to the “holding out the child as his own”
presumption, Appleton suggests that “[t]he rule most likely reflected a commonsense inference: Why would a man undertake such responsibility and public
acknowledgment of a child unless he knew he had fathered this child?” Appleton,
supra note 3, at 257.
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statutes have always sought to achieve the same well-accepted social
goals of vesting legal parentage in the persons that: (1) are
responsible for bringing the child into the world; (2) are most
likely to care for the child; and (3) are the ones expecting to be the
35
child’s legal parents. As explained below, the intended parents
fulfill these same roles for children conceived via ART.
1.

Granting Legal Parentage to the Persons Responsible for Bringing
the Child into the World

One goal of statutory parentage presumptions is to grant legal
parentage to the persons responsible for bringing the child into
36
the world. It makes sense that legal parentage should be
awarded—along with its attendant financial and social
responsibilities—to the persons responsible for bringing the child
37
into the world. Pursuant to the doctrine of parens patriae, states are
38
obligated to ensure that all children are cared for. Although states
take this obligation very seriously, they strongly prefer not to be the
actual care providers for children. Instead, states fulfill their parens
patriae obligations by establishing legal parent-child relationships,
thereby shifting the duty to care for the child to the persons
39
responsible for bringing the child into the world. For children
conceived via sexual reproduction, the genetic parents always will

35. Elizabeth Bartholet identified similar guidelines for determining legal
parents: (1) provide children early in life with permanent parents; (2) provide
children with nurturing parents; and (3) hold parents responsible. Bartholet,
supra note 30, at 337–42; see also Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of
Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 210, 218 (2012) (identifying three “threads” for
parentage rules: (1) parentage rules should provide stability; (2) the parents are
responsible for the child, not the state; and (3) “parentage determinations are not
made on a case-by-case basis”).
36. Purvis, supra note 6, at 661–63; see also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 325, 329 (2005).
37. See SHULMAN, supra note 1, at 30–31.
38. James G. Dwyer, A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the
Rights of Newborn Persons, 56 UCLA L. REV. 755, 766 (2009) (“The state acts vis a vis
every newborn baby in a protective and provisional role, pursuant to its longrecognized parens patriae authority . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Race Matters in Adoption, FAM. L.Q., Fall 2008, at 465,
467 n.10 (noting that parens patrie refers to the state’s role as protector of
children’s interests).
39. See Howe, supra note 38, at 467.
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be the persons responsible for bringing the child into the world.
Accordingly, using genetics as a basis for parentage determinations
of children conceived via sexual reproduction best effectuates this
first underlying goal.
For children conceived via ART, the intended parents always
will be the persons ultimately responsible for bringing the child
into the world. Indeed, conceiving a child using ART is one of the
most intentional acts a person or couple undertakes. The intended
parents must secure a means to fund the process, which, in the case
40
of in vitro fertilization, typically costs tens of thousands of dollars.
The intended parents must also research and choose gamete
providers (sperm donors and egg donors) and, in some cases, a
surrogate. Although gamete providers and surrogates play vital
roles in bringing the child into the world, it cannot be said that
these adults are “responsible” for doing so. In fact, in nearly all
cases, sperm donors, egg donors, and surrogates expressly
relinquish any responsibility beyond their role of providing
gametes or gestating the child. Thus, for children conceived via
ART, awarding parentage to the intended parents best effectuates
the goal of awarding parentage to the persons responsible for
bringing the child into the world.
2.

Granting Legal Parentage to the Persons Most Likely to Care for
the Child

Another goal of statutory parentage presumptions is to award
41
parentage to the persons most likely to care for the child. For
children conceived via sexual reproduction, genetics is the most
reliable and consistent indicator of whether an adult is likely to
42
care for a child throughout the child’s minority. That is not to say

40. Polina M. Dostalik, Embryo “Adoption”? The Rhetoric, the Law, and the Legal
Consequences, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 874 (2011).
41. DWYER, supra note 1, at 33 (“As with mothers, a state’s decision to make
the biological connection determinative where a man seeks paternity might be
based in part on an empirical assumption that a biological connection predisposes
an adult to care for a child.”).
42. MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS
MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAMESEX AND UNWED PARENTS 63 (2001) (stating that “since biological parents have a
variety of incentives to care for their children to the best of their ability, assigning
custody to them tends to protect children’s interests”); Shultz, supra note 12, at
319 (stating that “legal assignment of parental status has, typically drawn
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that adults always will be devoted to caring for the children to
whom they are genetically related. In some cases, a non-geneticlyrelated adult may be the adult most capable of caring for the child.
The goal of statutory parentage presumptions, however, is to
establish a factor, or set of factors, that consistently and reliably
predicts, at the moment of birth, who is most likely to care for a
child. If that prediction turns out to be incorrect, the law provides
43
mechanisms to terminate or limit parental rights down the road.
For children conceived via sexual reporoduction, all fifty states rely
on a genetic relationship as the best proxy for effectuating the
underlying social goal of awarding parentage to the persons most
likely to care for the child throughout his or her minority.
For children conceived via ART, the intent test is the most
reliable and consistent indicator of who is most likely to care for
the child. Intended parents who spend the time, energy, and
money to conceive a child via ART assume that they also are
responsible for supporting the child and caring for the child’s best
interests. This conclusion is supported by a recent empirical study
44
examining case outcomes in ART parentage determination cases.
The study examined over 200 cases and found that regardless of
the stated basis for the court’s decision, in over 74% of cases, the
45
court granted parentage to the intended parents. Since a bestinterests analysis is the cornerstone of nearly all legal
determinations regarding children, it is safe to assume that these
courts would not have placed children with their intended parents
were it not, in fact, in the child’s best interests and if it were not
legitimacy from its reflection of and alignment with biological givens”); see Annette
Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
683, 68586 (2001) (defending a system that bases legal parentage, at least in part,
on genetic relationship).
43. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the ParentChild Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011,
102526 (2003). Codified next to parentage presumptions is an extensive series of
laws concerning legal custody, physical custody, and parenting time—recognizing
that genetic parents often do not properly care for their genetic children. If a
genetic parent fails to act in the best interest of her child, or if a different adult
would more likely act in the child’s best interest, the state is granted permission to
make such legal determinations after the child is born. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b) (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(B) (West,
Westlaw through 2014 legislation); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 legislation).
44. Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1317–18, 1324.
45. Id. at 1317–18.
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likely that these adults would care for the child. Courts that
expressly used a best-interests analysis to determine legal parentage
of children conceived via ART awarded parentage to the intended
46
parents nearly 80% of the time. Thus, for children conceived via
ART, granting parentage to the intended parents best effectuates
the goal of granting parentage to the persons most likely to care for
the child.
3.

Granting Legal Parentage to the Persons Expecting to Be the
Child’s Parents

A third goal of statutory parentage presumptions is to grant
47
parentage to the persons expecting to be the child’s parents. For
children conceived via sexual reproduction, those adults are the
child’s genetic parents. When a woman gives birth to a child
conceived via sexual reproduction, no one at the hospital wonders
who is the child’s legal mother. It is evident that the woman who
just gave birth is the child’s legal mother. This is the outcome the
mother, her family, the community, and the law expects. Moreover,
this outcome does not change, even if the birth mother has
decided to place the child for adoption. The birth mother is still
deemed to be the child’s legal mother, and her legal parental
rights must be terminated in order for the child to be legally
48
adopted by another.
It may be somewhat less evident who the child’s presumptive
legal father is at the moment of the child’s birth. The laws in most
states provide that the child’s presumptive legal father is: (1) the
man who is married to the woman at the time of the child’s birth;
(2) the man who, along with the biological mother, expressly
acknowledges his paternity; or (3) the man who receives the child
into his home and openly holds out the child as his biological
49
child. These three presumptions serve as a proxy for determining
46. Id. at 1317–18 tbl.7b.
47. See DWYER, supra note 1, at 33 (asserting that determining parentage
based on a “biological connection . . . . rests in part on beliefs about the natural
entitlement of adults to possess their genetic offspring”); see also Purvis, supra note
35, at 211 (“Traditional rules of identifying parents codify intuitive presumptions
about parental status . . . .”); Dwyer, supra note 38, at 763 (“One might think it
natural, even divinely ordained, that biological parents become the custodians of a
baby.”).
48. See MINN. STAT. § 257.74.
49. See, e.g., id. § 257.55.
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50

who is genetically related to the child, thereby granting parentage
51
to the man expecting to be the child’s legal parent. Accordingly,
these presumptions best effectuate the underlying social goal of
awarding parentage to the persons expecting to be the
child’s parents.
For children conceived via ART, it is the intended parents who
expect to be declared the legal parents. Take, for example, a
couple consisting of two men who decide to conceive a child using
a gestational surrogate and the egg of an anonymous gamete
52
provider. At the time of transfer, the two men manifest their
intent to be the legal parents of the resulting child, and the gamete
provider and gestational surrogate manifest their intent not to be
the legal parents of the child. Upon the birth of the child, a
statutory parentage presumption based on the intent test would
create a legal parent-child relationship between the child and both
53
intended parents. This is the outcome the intended parents, their
families, the gamete provider, the gestational surrogate, and the
community expect. Thus, for children conceived via ART, granting
parentage to the intended parents best effectuates the goal of
granting parentage to the persons who expect to be declared the
legal parents.
Once a state decides to adopt self-executing parentage statutes
for all children conceived via ART, it must determine whom those
statutes should designate as the presumptive legal parents at the
moment of birth. An examination of current parentage statutes for
children conceived via sexual reproduction reveals that genetics is
used as the presumptive proxy to effectuate the social goals of
vesting legal parentage in the persons who are responsible for
bringing the child into the world, the persons most likely to care
for the child, and the persons expecting to be the child’s parents.
These same social goals can be effectuated for children conceived
via ART by enacting self-executing statutes that award legal
parentage to the child’s intended parents at the moment of birth.

50. See supra notes 24–35 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 34.
52. “Transfer” means the placement of gametes or embryos into a woman’s
reproductive tract for the purpose of achieving pregnancy and a live birth. See infra
Part III, § 101.
53. See Shultz, supra note 12, at 322–23.
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The Consensus in Favor of the Intent Test

For the past thirty years, legal commentators, legislatures, and
courts have been exploring the contours of the intent test and how
best to apply it in cases involving ART. Dozens of law review articles
have been written on the subject, with the vast majority favoring the
54
use of the intent test for ART. As early as 1998, Janet Dolgin
discussed an “emerging consensus” that was forming around the
55
intent test. Eleven years later, Nancy Polikoff described the intent
test as having “support from the mainstream of the legal
56
profession.” The following year, Courtney Joslin joined the
growing chorus of legal scholars advocating for the intent test,
questioning why the law has been so resistant to keeping up with
57
developments around ART.
In addition, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Bar Association
(ABA) have empaneled groups of experts in the field of family law
to consider parentage determinations of children conceived via
ART. Both groups incorporated the intent test into their model
58
statutes.
NCCUSL’s 2002 Uniform Parentage Act (2002 UPA)
expanded coverage of children conceived via ART. The 2002 UPA
54. See, e.g., Linda S. Anderson, Adding Players to the Game: Parentage
Determinations when Assisted Reproductive Technology is Used to Create Families, 62 ARK.
L. REV. 29, 5456 (2009); Difonzo & Stern, supra note 4, at 405–11; Linda D. Elrod,
A Child’s Perspective of Defining a Parent: The Case for Intended Parenthood, 25 BYU J.
PUB. L. 245, 266–70 (2011); Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage,
Gender, and Assisted Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1222–29 (2010);
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial Intimacy, 88 IND.
L.J. 1223, 125559 (2013); Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced
Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 107, 13639 (2014); Polikoff, supra note 26, at 23334, 26567; Purvis,
supra note 35, at 22730, 25253; Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of
Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 163840 (2013); Richard F. Storrow,
Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to
Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 67579 (2002).
55. Dolgin, supra note 11, at 23536, 28081.
56. Polikoff, supra note 26, at 234 (“A brief history of the law of assisted
reproduction demonstrates that the groundwork for a statute making consent
[with the intent to parent] the key to parentage . . . is in place and has support
from the mainstream of the legal profession.”).
57. Joslin, supra note 54, at 1180–81, 1222–23.
58. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 299–376
(Supp. 2014); MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008).
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addresses ART issues such as excluding gamete donors from
parentage, awarding parentage to the intended parents in a
gestational surrogacy, and covering situations in which a child is
59
conceived via ART after death or divorce. Although the 2002 UPA
makes progress toward incorporating the intent test, it falls short.
First, Article 7 (Child of Assisted Reproduction) uses language
60
making it applicable exclusively to heterosexual couples. Second,
although Article 8 (Gestational Agreements) incorporates an intent
element, it specifies that the intended parents must be married, in
turn alienating single parents and unmarried couples, including
61
same-sex couples in places where marriage is not possible. As a
result, the 2002 UPA fails to provide legal parents to all children at
62
the moment of birth.
Another attempt at legislating parentage in light of emerging
reproductive technologies is the ABA’s Model Act Governing
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ABA Model Act). Article 6 of
the ABA Model Act roughly mirrors Article 7 of the 2002 UPA, but
takes additional steps in the right direction by using the intent test
and gender-neutral language to determine parentage of children
63
conceived via ART. Article 7 of the ABA Model Act closely
resembles Article 8 of the 2002 UPA regarding gestational

59. It added language stating that, in addition to male sperm donors, female
egg donors should be excluded from parentage. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B
U.L.A. 355–56. The 2002 UPA also addresses gestational surrogacy; specifically,
Article 8 grants legal parentage to the intended parents, provided they are
married and have a court-approved gestational agreement. Id. § 801, 9B U.L.A.
362–63.
60. See id. § 703, 9B U.L.A. 356 (“A man who provides sperm for, or consents
to, assisted reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her
child, is a parent of the resulting child.”).
61. See id. § 801, 9B U.L.A. 362–63.
62. For a critique of the 2002 UPA, see Mary Patricia Byrn, From Right to
Wrong: A Critique of the 2000 Uniform Parentage Act, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 163,
17071 (2007).
63. “An individual who . . . consents to[] assisted reproduction by a woman
as provided in [this Act] with the intent to be a parent of her child is a parent of
the resulting child.” MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 603. In
2008, the Uniform Law Commissioners drafting the Uniform Probate Code also
addressed ART and incorporated the intent test. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120(f)
(1969) (amended 2010), 8 U.L.A. 129–31 (2013). “[A] parent-child relationship
exists between a child of assisted reproduction and an individual other than the
birth mother who consented to assisted reproduction by the birth mother with
intent to be treated as the other parent of the child.” Id.
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surrogacy agreements, with the exception that under the ABA
64
Model Act, the intended parents need not be married. Both
Articles 6 and 7 of the ABA Model Act are closer to an ideal statute,
although there are still unnecessary limitations including a
requirement of written consent and court approval for gestational
65
surrogacy agreements. Here again, progress is made, but the Act is
ultimately too narrow to provide legal parents to all children at the
moment of birth.
Individual state legislatures also have moved toward the intent
test. Illinois has incorporated the intent test into its Gestational
66
Surrogacy Act. Delaware’s Uniform Parentage Act includes a
provision for the paternity of children conceived via ART, which
states, “The child shall be considered the child of the intended
67
parent or parents immediately upon the birth of the child.”
Likewise, New Mexico’s Uniform Parentage Act grants parentage to
the intended parents provided they sign a required consent form
68
before conception.
Finally, based on an empirical study completed last year, we
now know that courts, too, favor awarding legal parentage of
children conceived via ART to the intended parents. In 2013,
researchers conducted an empirical study of all cases on Westlaw
69
addressing parentage of ART children. Each case was coded and
analyzed based on which test the court used to determine legal
parentage and which factors were statistically significant in making

64. Compare MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. art. 7, with UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 801–809, 9B U.L.A. 362–70.
65. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. arts. 6–7.
66. This Act, which went into effect in 2005 and applies exclusively to
surrogacy, allows for the intended parents to be the legal parents immediately
upon the birth of the child. The parties must create a valid surrogacy contract
meeting the requirements set forth in the statute, but unlike the 2002 UPA and
the Model Act, the agreement does not need court approval. This simplifies the
process for everyone involved. However, the Gestational Surrogacy Act could use
some refining in order to make the language less ambiguous. In some provisions it
uses “intended mother” and “intended father,” while in others it uses “intended
parent or parents.” Although this seems to say that the Act would apply to a single
parent, it may cause some confusion in determining whether it extends to samesex couples. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/10 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-703(b) (West, Westlaw through 2014
legislation).
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-704 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
69. Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1297.
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70

that determination. The empirical data demonstrates two
important findings. First, when faced with determining parentage
of ART children, most judges will apply a state statute to make their
decision, even if the statute did not originally contemplate the
71
situation before them. Second, and more importantly, regardless
of the test used by the court, in over 74% of the cases, the outcome
72
was the same as if the intent test had been used. Both of these
findings are discussed below.
Without clear guidance from the legislature, finding a basis for
parentage determinations for children conceived via ART has been
73
left to the courts. The empirical data shows that, over the past 30
years, courts have developed five different tests to determine
parentage of children conceived via ART: (1) applying a state
statute; (2) relying on public policy; (3) determining what is in the
best interests of the child; (4) awarding parentage to the genetic
parents; and (5) awarding parentage to the adults who, at the time
74
of conception, intended to raise the child.
Judges used a statutory approach in over 51% of the cases
surveyed, even if the statute did not expressly cover the particular
75
situation before them. For example, the Oregon Court of Appeals
expanded the application of its alternative insemination statute,
which applied only to a woman and her husband, to include the
same-sex domestic partner of a woman who gave birth to a child
76
conceived via alternative insemination. The court recognized that
the presumptions in Oregon’s parentage statute were designed, in
part, “to protect children conceived by artificial insemination from

70. Id.
71. See id. at 1301–04.
72. Id. at 1316–18.
73. See, e.g., Difonzo & Stern, supra note 4, at 376–77 (“Courts are the
beachhead for this revolution, because society is evolving faster than the formal
legal system, and disputes are often presented to judges who have little statutory or
case law guidance in these new areas.”); Dolgin, supra note 11, at 234 (“Courts
have spearheaded and sustained the law’s response to reproductive technology in
the United States. Legislatures have been slow to respond, and when they have
responded, they have rarely created comprehensive regulatory schemes.”).
74. Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1301.
75. Id. at 1304. Over 20% of judges applied the intent test, 16% applied a
best-interests-of-the-child analysis, 8% relied on public policy, and 3% based their
decision on genetics. Id. at 1309 tbl.1.
76. Shineovich & Kemp, 214 P.3d 29, 40 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); see OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 109.243 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
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being denied the right to support by the mother’s husband or to
77
inherit from the husband.” The court concluded that this
presumption should apply regardless whether the couple was
comprised of a woman and her husband, or a woman and her
78
same-sex partner.
The judiciary’s desire to take a statutory approach makes sense
in light of the fact that parentage laws always have been matters for
the legislature, and applying a statute is the standard protocol
when it comes to determining parentage. The cases in the
empirical study show that judges are willing to go to great lengths
to find and apply a statute, as opposed to, say, using a best-interestsof-the-child approach, because they do not believe that establishing
initial parentage should be determined by a case-by-case, factual
inquiry.
The judiciary’s preference for a statutory approach highlights
the need for each state to adopt a comprehensive parentage statute
that covers all children conceived via ART. When there is a dispute
over parentage, courts should be able to apply a state statute in a
straightforward and predictable manner. Such statutes would
remove the legal uncertainty, for both the parent and the child,
currently present in ART cases. Moreover, comprehensive
parentage statutes that cover all children conceived via ART would
largely eliminate the need for the courts to be involved at all. When
a child is conceived via sexual reproduction, there is no post-birth
factual inquiry; a judge is not required to weigh facts before
declaring the mother and father legal parents. Rather, a selfexecuting parentage statute, based on a set of presumptions,
operates to create the legal parent-child relationship. Parenting
determinations for children conceived via ART should be no
different than parentage determinations for children conceived via
sexual reproduction—no less automatic, no less predictable, and
no less equitable.
The most significant finding of the empirical study was the fact
that, in the overwhelming majority of ART parentage cases, legal
79
parentage was granted to the intended parents. In over 20% of

77. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40.
78. Id. (“There appears to be no reason for permitting heterosexual couples
to bypass adoption proceedings by conceiving a child through mutually
consensual artificial insemination, but not permitting same-sex couples to do so.”).
79. Byrn & Giddings, supra note 18, at 1316–18.
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80

cases, judges applied the intent test. Of the remaining cases,
regardless of the stated basis of the judge’s decision—statute, best
interests of the child, public policy, or genetics—in over 66% of
cases, the result was the same as if the judge had used the intent
81
test. These results confirm that the intent test is a common-sense
approach to determining parentage that is consistent with the
overarching goals of determining legal parentage. These results
also confirm that adopting ART statutes based on the intent test
will, in the majority of circumstances, lead to outcomes that are
aligned with how judges currently determine parentage in ART
cases.
III. PROPOSED MODEL ACT GOVERNING PARENTAGE OF CHILDREN
CONCEIVED VIA ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
Following is a model parentage act regarding ART that, if
adopted, would determine legal parentage of all children
conceived via ART at the moment of birth. The provisions draw
82
from prior uniform and model acts—in particular, the 2002 UPA
83
and the ABA Model Act —both of which utilize the intent test but
ultimately fall short of covering all children concevied via ART.
Some of the differences between these acts and our provisions are:
 Our provisions acknowledge the parentage of same-sex
84
couples who intend to be legal parents.
 Our provisions rely more comprehensively on the intent test,
granting legal parentage even in the absence of formalities
85
such as a written contract.
 When surrogacy is used, our provisions automatically provide
legal parentage to the intended parents upon the birth of the
86
child, without requiring judicial intervention.
80. Id. at 1309 tbl.1.
81. Id. at 1316–19.
82. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 299–376 (Supp.
2014).
83. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (2008).
84. Contra UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704, 9B U.L.A. 356–57 (contemplating
consent to assisted reproduction by “a woman and a man”).
85. Contra MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 604 (“Consent
by an individual who intends to be a parent of a child born by assisted
reproduction must be in a signed record.”).
86. Contra UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 803, 9B U.L.A 364 (“If the requirements of
subsection (b) are satisfied, a court may issue an order validating the gestational
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The main difference between the 2002 UPA and ABA Model
Act and our model act is that our model act provides a simpler and
more comprehensive set of provisions that determines legal
parentage of all children conceived via ART at the moment of
birth. We offer this proposed model act with the hope that state
legislatures will modify their existing parentage statutes to include
these provisions.
SECTION 101. DEFINITIONS
(1) “Assisted reproduction” means a method of achieving
pregnancy through means other than sexual intercourse.
(2) “Gamete provider” means an individual who provides eggs
or sperm to be used for assisted reproduction, whether or not the
gamete provider also is an intended parent, whether or not the
gametes are provided for consideration, and whether or not the
gamete provider is known by the intended parent(s) or is
anonymous.
(3) “Gestational agreement” means an agreement between the
intended parent(s) and a gestational carrier regarding the use of
assisted reproduction for the purpose of achieving pregnancy and a
live birth.
(4) “Gestational carrier” means a woman who gestates a child
that was conceived via assisted reproduction. This definition
includes a “traditional surrogate” (a woman who is not an intended
parent who undergoes insemination and fertilization of her own
eggs), a “gestational surrogate” (a woman who is not an intended
parent into whom an embryo formed using eggs other than her
own is transferred), and a “gestational mother” (a woman who is an
intended parent who carries the child by any means of assisted
reproduction).
(5) “Intended parent” means an individual, married or
unmarried, who manifests the intent to be the legal parent of a
child conceived via assisted reproduction. The intent to be a legal
parent must be manifested at the time of transfer.
(6) “Legal parent” means an individual who has a legally
recognized parent-child relationship with a child.
(7) “Legal spouse” means an individual married to another, or
who has a legal relationship to another that this state accords rights

agreement and declaring that the intended parents will be the parents of a child
born during the term of the agreement.”).
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and responsibilities equal to, or substantially equivalent to, those of
marriage.
(8) “Posthumous conception” means the transfer of gametes
or embryos for the purpose of achieving pregnancy and a live birth
after a gamete provider who is also an intended parent has died.
(9) “Transfer” means the placement of gametes or embryos
into a woman’s reproductive tract for the purpose of achieving
pregnancy and a live birth.
87
Authors’ Commentary
88
Section 101 draws from 2002 UPA section 102 and ABA
89
Model Act section 102.
Subsection (2), “gamete provider.” Both the 2002 UPA and the
ABA Model Act use the term “donor.” These statutory provisions
use “gamete provider” because many people who provide gametes
do not “donate” their genetic material. A variety of individuals
provide gametes to be used for assisted reproduction, including:
(1) men and women who provide gametes to known and unknown
third parties for compensation; (2) men and women who provide
gametes to known and unknown third parties for no compensation;
and (3) men and women who provide gametes for the purpose of
becoming an intended parent.
Subsection (3), “gestational agreement.” These statutory
provisions do not contain specific requirements of a gestational
agreement. In order to protect the interests of everyone involved,
we recommend that a gestational agreement be in writing, which is
often the clearest way to manifest intent. See the Illinois
90
Gestational Surrogacy Act for an example of a comprehensive
statute governing gestational agreements. Each state that adopts
these provisions may specify the necessary components of a
gestational agreement.
SECTION 102. SCOPE OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS
These statutory provisions apply only to children conceived via
assisted reproduction. These provisions do not apply to children
conceived via sexual intercourse.

87. The commentary after each section is for the reader’s own use. It is not
meant to be enacted along with the statutory provisions.
88. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102, 9B U.L.A 303–06.
89. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102.
90. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1–75 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.).
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Authors’ Commentary
91
Section 102 draws from 2002 UPA section 701 and ABA
92
Model Act section 601.
SECTION 103. PARENTAL STATUS OF GAMETE PROVIDER
A gamete provider may or may not also be a legal parent of a
child conceived via assisted reproduction. A gamete provider is also
a legal parent only if he or she meets the requirements of section
105.
Authors’ Commentary
93
Section 103 diverges from 2002 UPA section 702 and ABA
94
Model Act section 602, which provide that a “donor” is never a
legal parent of a child conceived via assisted reproduction.
Some gamete providers provide gametes to third parties with
the express intention of not becoming a legal parent. Other
gamete providers may be intended parents pursuant to section
105—for instance, a woman who provides her fertilized eggs to her
same-sex spouse or partner and intends to be the legal parent of
the resulting child immediately upon birth of the child.
SECTION 104. PARENTAL STATUS OF GESTATIONAL
CARRIER
A gestational carrier may or may not also be a legal parent of a
child conceived via assisted reproduction. A gestational carrier is
also a legal parent only if she meets the requirements of section
105.
Authors’ Commentary
95
Section 104 diverges from 2002 UPA section 801(a)(2) and
96
ABA Model Act section 701(1)(b), which use a narrower
97
definition of gestational carrier than section 104 employs.

91. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701, 9B U.L.A. 354.
92. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 601.
93. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355–56.
94. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 602.
95. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 362.
96. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 701(1)(b).
97. See id. § 102(16) (“‘Gestational carrier’ means an adult woman, not an
intended parent, who enters into a gestational agreement to bear a child . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
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Some gestational carriers bear children with the express
intention of not becoming a legal parent. Other gestational carriers
may be intended parents pursuant to section 105—for instance, a
woman who bears a child using fertilized eggs provided to her by
her same-sex spouse or partner and who intends to be the legal
parent of the resulting child immediately upon birth of the child.
SECTION 105. PARENTAGE OF CHILD CONCEIVED VIA
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
An individual who intends to be a legal parent of a child
conceived via assisted reproduction is a legal parent of the resulting
child immediately upon birth of the child. An individual’s intent to
be a legal parent must be objectively manifested and mutually
agreed-upon by all intended parents at the time of transfer. A
written agreement between the intended parents may serve as
evidence of intent.
Authors’ Commentary
98
Section 105 draws from 2002 UPA section 704 and ABA
99
Model Act sections 603 and 604. This section codifies the intent
test, which provides that the adult or adults who intended to bring
a child into the world through the use of assisted reproduction and
who intended to parent the child are the legal parents of the
100
resulting child immediately upon birth.
To be as inclusive as possible to the individuals who use
assisted reproduction, this section is gender-neutral and makes no
distinction between married and unmarried individuals. The
marital presumption of paternity does not establish parentage of a
child conceived via assisted reproduction. Nor does a woman’s
giving birth to a child conceived via assisted reproduction establish
maternity of the resulting child. Under this section, an individual
may establish parentage only through intent.

98. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 704, 9B U.L.A. 356–57.
99. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. §§ 603–04.
100. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (vesting legal
parentage in the party or parties that affirmatively intended to conceive a child via
assisted reproduction and to raise the resulting child because the child would not
exist “[b]ut for their acted-on intention”); see also Shultz, supra note 12, at 323
(“Within the context of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are
voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express, and bargained-for ought presumptively to
determine legal parenthood.”).
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Often, a written agreement among the intended parents is
used to objectively manifest intent to be a legal parent of a child
101
conceived via assisted reproduction. However, there are cases in
which intent to be a legal parent is objectively manifested and
mutually agreed-upon by each intended parent in the absence of a
written agreement. This section does not require a written
agreement because some intended parents do not have the legal
knowledge or financial means to execute a written agreement, or
choose not to have a written agreement for other reasons. Not
requiring a written agreement ensures that the intended parents
are protected and that their children conceived via assisted
reproduction have legal parents at birth.
Courts increasingly recognize that families sometimes include
102
more than two parents.
These statutory provisions do not
preclude recognition of more than two intended parents. The
language requiring mutual agreement among all intended parents,
however, provides a limiting factor as to the number of intended
parents recognized under this section. States may choose to include
a provision expressly limiting the number of intended parents a
child may have.
SECTION 106. WITHDRAWAL OF INTENT TO BE A LEGAL
PARENT
An individual’s intent to be a legal parent via assisted
reproduction may be withdrawn by that individual at any time
before transfer by objectively manifesting the withdrawal to the
other intended parent (or parents). An individual who withdraws

101. An example of a statute that requires a written agreement in order to vest
parentage in the intended parent(s) is the Illinois Gestational Surrogacy Act. See
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/10 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.) (“‘Intended
parent’ means a person or persons who enters into a gestational surrogacy
contract with a gestational surrogate pursuant to which he or she will be the legal
parent of the resulting child.”).
102. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 47576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(granting the biological mother, her former lesbian partner, and the known male
gamete provider custody rights); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (2002) (recognizing “legal
parents,” “parent[s] by estoppel,” and “de facto parents” in its definitions); Susan
Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 1719 (2008);
Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 32732 (2007);
Laura T. Kessler, Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 7475 (2007).
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intent before transfer is not a legal parent of the resulting child. An
individual may not withdraw intent to be a legal parent after
transfer.
Authors’ Commentary
103
Section 106 draws from 2002 UPA section 706 and ABA
104
Model Act section 606.
SECTION 107. EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
(a) If a marriage is dissolved before transfer, any prior intent
to be a legal parent of a child conceived via assisted reproduction is
presumed revoked. If, after dissolution, former legal spouses
objectively manifest the intent to be legal parents of the resulting
child at the time of transfer, both are legal parents of the resulting
child pursuant to section 105.
(b) If a marriage is dissolved after transfer, and both legal
spouses intended at the time of transfer to be legal parents of the
resulting child, they are both legal parents of the resulting child.
Authors’ Commentary
105
Section 107 draws from 2002 UPA section 706 and ABA
106
Model Act section 606.
SECTION 108. DISPUTE OF PARENTAGE
The legal parent of a child conceived via assisted reproduction
may not challenge his or her parentage of the child under section
105 unless a proceeding is commenced to adjudicate parentage
within two years after the legal parent learns of the birth of the
child.
Authors’ Commentary
107
Section 108 draws from 2002 UPA section 705 and ABA
108
Model Act section 605. Unlike the 2002 UPA and ABA Model Act,
this provision is not limited to legal spouses.

103. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706 (2000) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 358
(Supp. 2014).
104. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 606.
105. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 706, 9B U.L.A. 358.
106. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 606.
107. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 705, 9B U.L.A. 357–58.
108. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 605.
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SECTION 109. PARENTAL STATUS OF DECEASED
INDIVIDUAL
Except as otherwise provided in this state’s probate code, if an
individual who intended to be a legal parent pursuant to section
105 dies before transfer of that individual’s gametes, the deceased
individual is not a legal parent of a child resulting from
posthumous conception unless the deceased individual objectively
manifested the intent that if assisted reproduction were to occur
after death, the deceased individual would be a legal parent of the
child. If an intended parent dies after transfer, he or she is a legal
parent of the resulting child.
Authors’ Commentary
109
Section 109 draws from 2002 UPA section 707 and ABA
110
Model Act section 607.
In Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., the Supreme Court endorsed
the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§§ 416(e) and 416(h)(2)(A), which are used to determine whether
a posthumously conceived child meets the definition of a “child”
under the Social Security Act and is thus eligible for survivor
111
benefits. The Social Security Administration’s longstanding policy
is to “‘apply [the intestacy law of the insured individual’s
112
domiciliary State].’”
Given the limited means of ascertaining the intent of a
deceased gamete provider who is also a purported intended parent,
it is recommended that a state require clear and convincing
evidence that the deceased individual objectively manifested intent
that if transfer were to occur after death, the deceased individual
would be a legal parent of the child.
A state may also wish to impose a time limit, after death, within
113
which the surviving intended parent(s) must act.

109. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 707, 9B U.L.A. 358–59.
110. MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 607.
111. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012).
112. See id. at 2028 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)).
113. See Benjamin C. Carpenter, A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How Cryopreservation
Has Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, and How
to Fix It, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 425 (2011) (“It is important to establish
a limitation period to provide finality to the administration process in those
scenarios where a posthumously conceived child could ‘divest’ others of all or part
of their share of the decedent’s estate. Without this, an estate could remain open
indefinitely while the executor waits for a posthumously conceived child to be
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IV. CONCLUSION
For several decades, parentage of children conceived via ART
has been left to the courts. During that time, legal scholars have
advocated for the application of the intent test to determine
parentage of children conceived via ART. In addition, model acts
have incorporated the intent test, as have several state legislatures.
New empirical data shows that in over 74% of disputed parentage
cases involving ART, judges awarded parentage to the intended
parents. A consensus has been reached. Scholars, legislatures, and
courts agree that the intent test is the appropriate means for
determining legal parentage at the moment of birth for children
conceived via ART. Using the intent test as the basis for parentage
statutes for children conceived via ART provides an automatic,
efficient, and predictable means of determining parentage that is
consistent with the overarching goals of determining legal
parentage and will ensure that all children have legal parents at the
moment of birth. The time has come for state legislatures to codify
the intent test.

born—an event which may never happen.”).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2015

27

